National Law School Journal
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 2

7-1-1995

Commonwealth Developments in Fiduciary Laws
Andrew S. Butler

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj

Recommended Citation
Butler, Andrew S. (1995) "Commonwealth Developments in Fiduciary Laws," National Law School Journal:
Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj/vol7/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in National Law School Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact library@nls.ac.in.

(1995) 7 NLSJ 31

COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENTS

IN FIDUCIARY LAW
Andrew S. Butler*

"It seems to have become fashionable in the last few years for people to
allege fiduciary duties and their breach in all sorts of circumstances. There
will be no doubt many cases where a plea of breach of fiduciary duty is apt. It
must, however, be recognised that the concept is not a universal panacea. " per
Tipping J. in Bowkett v Action Finance Lid. [1992] 1 N. Z. L. R. 449, 455
(H. C.).
INTRODUCTION
The law of fiduciary

obligations

is a central

part of the law of Equity. We

are all, doubtless, familiar with its basic field of operation: the trusting relationship,
where, because the trust reposed by one in another provides the latter with an
opportunity to advantage himself, the law exacts various duties of loyalty, designed
to discourage behaviour inconsistent with the nature of the relationship. Thus, a
fiduciary must not profit from the relationship, must not put himself in a position
of potential conflict between his own interests and those of the beneficiary, and
so on. Traditionally, the application of fiduciary law was limited to a set of timehonoured status-based relationships
such as solicitor-client (and other advisory
relationships), partners, agent-principal, director-company and so on.
However,

as the passage

(quoted

above)

from Tipping

J's judgment

in

Bowkett v Action Finance Lid reveals, the last number of years have witnessed
an upsurge
driven by
a fiduciary
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the wide and generous range of remedial advantages available against
who has breached his fiduciary obligations. I Proprietary remedies (in
more flexible tracing rules of equity; the possibility of forcing a
fiduciary into disgorging profits made from a breach of fiduciary
(a remedy unavailable for the majority of non-equitable c1aims)2; the
of liability; and, the more relaxed equitable rules as to foreseeability

Lccturcr,
givcn

among

(1988).

(Rcv'd

cdn.,

1989),

and remoteness
are some of the reasons that lawyers would prefer, where
possible, to frame a claim in fiduciary law as opposed to traditional common law
actions such as tort and contract. With so great a range of prizes on offer (if I
may so refer to the remedial advantages of fiduciary law) it is no wonder that
lawyers have been keen to persuade the courts to apply the label 'fiduciary' to
relationships
outside the field of the traditional fiduciary relationships, ana have
urged the courts to evolve a general principle. Over the last number of years the
courts of the Commonwealth
have responded to this challenge and a number of
interesting
attempts have been made to formulate underlying
rules intended to govern the imposition of fiduciary obligations.
The relevance of these Commonwealth
developments
First, section 88 of the Indian Trusts Act 1882 (hereafter

principles

and

to India is obvious.
the 1882 Act) states

that advantages gained
company, legal adviser

by "a trustee, executor, partner, agent, director of a
or other person bound in a fiduciary character to
protect the interests of another person" must be held for the benefit of that
other person; clearly to the extent that it provides workable tests and principles
for determining when a fiduciary relationship arises, Commonwealth jurisprudence
(and literature) will be of great assistance to Indian courts and practitioners
when dealing with the open-ended wording of section 88. Second, the recent
government-sponsored
liberalisalion of business and capital markets means that
litigation surrounding
a large range of day-to-day business transactions in India
will inevitably focus, as elsewhere in the Commonwealth,
on the potential
invocation of equitable relief and remedies.:1 In considering how the law should
evolve to deal with these developments,
Commonwealth
experience will be of
great assistance. Third, I am well aware of the emphasis in the National Law
School curriculum on the relationship between law and societal values, and on
the importance of closing the gap between the two, a matter which members of
the Supreme Court of India have also commented upon in the past.' In light of
this concern, it is of significance that the fiduciary concept has proven to be an
important intermediating
legal concept, converting moral imperatives into legal
obligation."

3

See, the recent discussion paper of the English Law Commission. Fiduciary Duties and Rellulatory
Rules, (London: H. ~1. S. 0 .. 1992) which considers the interaction between fiduciary law and the
various regulatory regimes approved under the Financial Services Act, 1986.

4

The following observations of Bhagwati J. (as he then was) in Moli/u/ /'uduml'ul SU.'IurMills v ,','lule of
flllur /'radesh A. 1. R. 1979 S. C. 621. 643 (a case of estoppel against the State) seem apposite: "The law
cannot acquire legitimacy and gain social acceptance unless it accords with the moral values of the
society and the constant endeavour of the Courts and the legislature must. therefore, be to ~lose the gap
between law and morality and bring about as near an approximation between the two as possible."

5

In the excellent book. J. C. Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries (1981), J. C. Shepherd has stated, at p. v,
"The law of fiduciaries is the legal system's attempt to recognise the more blatant abuses of the trust we
place in each other. It is undoubtedly the most human area of the legal system, and as sueh the most
undefinable. "
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The four issues which norm<.llly arise for determination
is invoked are as follows:'i
(i)

Is the relationship

(ii)

What is the nature
relationship;

(iii)

Has any duty been hreached:

(iv)

What liabilities result from the breach of duty.

where fiduciary law

between the parties fiduciary in nature;
of the duty/dulies

that

arise

from the

particular

Clearly, thesc four issues taken together provide more than enough material
to write a book! My project is a litllc more modest, concentrating,
in the main,
on the first of these four issues, viz. is the rclationship
between the par lies
fiduciary in nature.
To do this, I have divided

up my discussion

into three

parts.

The first

examines a number of gencral thcmes which have a significant impact
development
of the fiduciary concept. Among thesc are: the applicability

on
of

fiduciary norms to commercial transactions, the moral and social purposes of the
law and the impact these have on the formation
of legal principle,
the
interrelationship
betwcen fiduciary law and the law of undue influence, and so
on. The next part will move to considcr two tcsts which have found favour with
Commonwealth
courts in determining the applicability of fiduciary law to novel
situations. Third, I will commcnd for your especial consideration the approach of
Professor Robert Flanningan of Saskatchewan
Law School. His thesis is that
fiduciary law is triggered wherever a person has access to assets (belonging to
another person) for a limited purpose, and he also suggests a general range
obligations which mayor may not be applicable to such situatiolls depending
the type of access, the extcnt of the limits which the purpose imposes, and so
Before concluding, I will attach II ridcr relevant to the appliclltion of aspects
Commonwcllith ll.\w to the Indilln situlllion.
GENERAL

of
on
on.
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THEMES

Commercial transactions and fiduciary law
A particull.lrly important theme in the evolution of the modern lawi has
been the interaction betwcen commercilll trllnsllctions LInd fiduciary ILIW.Fiduciary
IllW is often invoked in commercial situlltions for rcmedial reasons - the llvailability
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Hon.

Relationships

~lr Justice
2·5 (p.O.

G. A. I(ennedy,
Finn

cd .. 1987),

of proprietary
remedies or an account of profits in cases of bankruptcy,
receivership, failed partnership, failed joint venture, breach of confidentiality and
so on, encourage the assertion of fiduciary obligations against the defendant.
However, there has been considerable judicial reticence in applying fiduciary
doctrine to commercial transactions. It is said that commercial relationships
are
ones which are inherently 'at arm's length' and that no trusting component is
involved. It is argued that the nature of the obligations between the parties
ought to be determined

through the contract-negotiation
process, and not imposed
fiduciary law.x Moreover, it is said that because it will
provide a bridgehead for discretionary justice into commercial law, the intrusion
of fiduciary notions will spell disaster for certainty in commercial transactions.

ex post facto through

The opposing view is that it is not appropriate for the law to isolate such
an important part of social interaction as commerce from the norms of society,
and, moreover, that ideas of justice and fairness have a role to play in commerce
as much as in other areas of society.!!
Once one looks beyond the rhetoric,

a number of important

points emerge:

(a)

It is trite to observe that a number of the most fundamental
fiduciary
relationships are commercial in character: e.g. agent-principal, partnerships,
director-company.
Thus, any claim that fiduciary law and commerce do not
intersect is an overstatement.

(b)

the claim that the fiduciary obligation would undermine the certainty
commercial
law rests on an assumption
which overstates the claim
certainty of that part of the common
commercial relationships. ill

(c)

law and statute

of
to

law which govern

even a cursory reading of much of the case law and literature
in the
fiduciary field reveals the rhetorical significance of the phrase "arm's length
transaction".
It is often said that "arm's length transactions" ought rarely to
be subjected to fiduciary obligations; with this no-one can disagree, except
to say that it does not go far enough- - once neither party has committed
itself to act in the other's interest, and has preserved the ability to act in its
self-interest (inherent in the notion of "arm's length"), then fiduciary law
can have no role to play. However, the invocation of the arm's length
rhetoric has a more subtle function to serve: The manner in which the
phrase is normally invoked suggests that it is appropriate
to label all
commercial transactions
as arm's length ones, and so, in reverse, to show

8

See, thc judgmcnts of, rcspcctivcly, Gibbs C. J." Wilson J. and Dawson J. in lIospital l'rodu('/s LId. v
United States Surgical Corporation (1985) 156 C. L. R. 41.

9

See, La Forcst J. in I_AC Millerals v llltemutimwi Corolla Nesourl'es (1989) 61 D. L. R. (4th) 14, at pp.
43 and 44, and R. Flannigan, "Fiduciary Obligation in the Suprcme Court", 54 Susko L. Nev. 45, 70
(1990), [Flannigan 19901.

10

See, thc argumcnts sct out by Kcnnedy, Supra n. 7, at 5-13, which support this vicw.
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that the transaction is commercial in nature is tantamount to showing that
fiduciary law has 110 role to play. Not only does such an approach run
counter to the point made in (a) above, but it is also an over-generalisation.
As a High Court of Australia judge, Mason J. (as he then was), observed in

Hospital Products Ltd. v United States Surgical Corporation, II
The fact that in the great majority of commercial transactions the
parties stand at arm's length does not enable us to make a generalisation
that is universally true in relation to every commercial transaction. In
truth every such transaction must be examined on merits with a view
to ascertaining whether it manifests the characteristics of a fiduciary
relationship.
In sum, the use of "Commercial transaction" phraseology must be seen for
what it is - a rhetorical device designed to replace the close examination of
the facts and the application of clear analytical reasoning, which this area
of the law requires. As a descriptive device it is "not particularly helpful in
the characterisation
of a relationship" and its use should be shunned.12
(d)

Since the principal fear animating the minds of those who resist fiduciary
law's intrusion into the general commercial arena appears to be the wide
range of remedial relief available once a breach of fiduciary obligation has
been found, perhaps the time has come to hold that proof of the breach of
particular obligations do not necessarily trigger a pre-ordained set of remedial
responses and those alone. Certainly, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has
signalled its intention to break the association between certain sets of
remedies and a corresponding
set of causes of action, preferring instead a
new remedial policy which decides remedial issues on the basis of what is
the most appropriate to the breach disclosed on the facts of each particular
case.1:l Whether such a development
is readily transposable
to India is
complicated

by the statutory

obstacles which will be outlined

at the end.

(e)

A common argument claims that, in the case of commercial transactions,
the protection provided by fiduciary law could just as easily have been
negotiated for and set out in a contract. The hub of the point is that the
parties could have contracted for duties of loyalty but did not, and it is not
for the courts to invoke fiduciary law so as to repair the effects of a failure

11

Supra n. 8, at 100. In addition. similar comments are to be found in the judgment of La Forest J. of the
Supreme Court of Canada in /-IIC Millerals. Supra n. 9, at p.43, and in the various authorities referred
to in R. Flannigan, "The Fiduciary Obligation" 9 (). ./. /" S. 285. 305. (1989) n. 108, [Flannigan 19891.
See also, 1. R. F. Lehane, "Fiduciaries in a Commercial Context" in Finn 1985, Supra n. I, at 104.

12

Eiehelbaum C. J. in /Jucke" v S/ormon/ (CP 736/87. Wellington. 7/11/1988)
in Commerce, 7 (1993).

13

See, IIquaculiure Corpora/ion v NX (;reen Mussel Co Ud [1990J 3 N. Z. L. R. 299, 301-302, and the
eases cited therein. For criticism of this development, See, J. l-1axton, EQuitv Update, 6-7 (1993).
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eited in C. Rickett, fu!..\illy

to exercise proper business caution. Doubtless, there is merit in this
argument, particularly in its assertion of the values of freedom of contract
and its emphasis on self-responsibility.
As against this approach,
two
arguments may be made. The first is that fiduciary law is, or ought to be
seen as, a default system of law:!" in other words, where the normal tests
would lead to finding that fiduciary law applies, then the fiduciary regime
applies unless the parties a~ree to exclude its application. The onus then is
on the defendant to show that the parties agreed to operate outside the
reach of fiduciary law, not the other way about. The second argument is
one based on economic efficiency. A number of commentators from the law
and economics perspective
hold the opinion that in those commercial
relationships
where fiduciary law has achieved
some consistency
of
application,
fiduciary law enhances economic efficiency.
For example,
Professor Austin has observed:
1.-,

The law of fiduciary duties as a whole is efficient in economic
terms hecause thl! law makes it unnecessary for a principal who
delegates power to an agent to protect himself by contractual
stipulation against a possible catalogue of possible acts of disloyalty.
The law of fiduciary obligations protects him. By saving the cost
of individual contracting the law facilitates specialisation in
economic enterprise, and hence enhances productivity.lh

.;

The correct approach. in my opinion, is the one put forward by La Forest 1.
of the Supreme Court of Canada in L/IC Minerals v International Corona
Resources, Ii where his Honour said, "The fact that the parties could have
concluded a contract to cover the situation but did not in fact do so does
not, in my opinion determine the matter. .. The existence of an alternative
procedure (such as contracting for fiduciary-style duties) is only relevant in
my mind if the parties would realistically have been expected to contemplate
it as an alternative".

The 'Social utility' dimension
An important theme is the emphasis given by courts and commentators
alike to the public policy which informs fiduciary law. That policy is the promotion
14
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and preservation
of trusting relationships.
the reason being that "trust in each
other remains the pervasive force which allows man to be the social animal his
instincts demand. "IX The invocation of this public policy and the use of moral
language which accompanies
it (which marks fiduciary law apart from other
areas of private law I!}) serve two distinct purposes when it comes to the substantive
shape of fiduciary law. one essentially defensive, the other essentially offensive.
First, the strict application of fiduciary law's vigorously prophylactic remedial
regime is said to be justified by the need to guarantee effective protection for so
fundamental an aspect of human interaction - the argument is that the unwavering
application of fiduciary remedies is designed to send a deterrence message to all
fiduciaries?'
not just those before the court. The courts rely on this type of
argumentation,
in particular, a remedy which may appear unjust to the defendant
in a particular
case, or which may amount to a novel solution given the
circumstances
of the case.~l Second. where analogy to previous case law, or
application of traditional tests. fails to cover a situation, yet the court is of the
opinion that a trusting relationship has been breached. then the 'social utility'
argument will be used as a fall-back to justify the application of fiduciary law to
the novel situation.~2

Factual analysis and the use of categories
The interaction
between the so-called traditional categories of fiduciary
relationships
and the repeated self-directed admonition by the courts to engage
in a close factual analysis wherever fiduciary claims are made~:1 is crucial to a
proper understanding
of both the way in which fiduciary law operates and its
future development.
The traditional status-based categories of fiduciary relationships
are those
within which it is assumed great potential for abuse of trust exists. Thus, wherever
an advantage is alleged to have been obtained by a fiduciary who is a party to
one of the traditional categories it is presumed that any advantage gained was
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obtained

in breach of fiduciary obligations.

and an onus lies with the fiduciary to

justify the transaction.21 A standard set of obligations which reflect the typical
extent of trust reposed within each particular relationship has grown up over the
years; but it is open to either party to demonstrate
that the obligations in a
particular relationship deviate from the norm.2'i Thus. it will be seen that even
where a case involves one of the traditional fiduciary relationships
and triggers
the presumptions
pertaining
aspect of the case.
Where

thereto,

a close factual analysis is still an important

the case does not fall within one of the traditional

categories,

it is

still possible to argue that it falls within the fiduciary principle on the basis of its
own specific facts. Such fact-based fiduciary relationships mean a lot more work
for the putative beneficiary's counsel in terms of proof. Counsel must demonstrate
the reason why the relationship is fiduciary in nature, set out the obligations
which flow from the relationship. and prove the breach.2(j It is for this reason,
that counsel will work hard to establish that the case falls within a traditional
category.
An interesting recent development feeds on the consistent judicial statements
to the effect that the categories of fiduciary relationship are not closedY The
corollary that flows from this is that it must still be open to the courts to accept
that relationships, not previously recognised as being fiduciary in nature, should
be so recognised. For example, counsel can argue that the Court should include
the relationship before it. within the category of status-based fiduciary relationships.
Thus, it has been held that company promoters have fiduciary obligations, and

24

As to what amounts to sufficient justification in any particular case is uncertain. For example, it has
been held in the famous case of f(eech v Salldford (1726) Sel. Cas. T. "ing 61: 25 E. R. 223, that where
a trustee obtains a lease renewal (prior to renewal it being held for the beneficiary) for his own benefit,
then it is an inflexible rule of Equity that the lease be held on trust for the beneficiary, even if no
wrongdoing occurred. Whether this type of irrebuttable presumption applies across the board of all
fiduciary obligations is unsettled, and a numher of judges and commentators have attacked attempts to
hroaden the application of f(eech v Samlfurd. beyond the scope of its own fact situation. For more on
this controversy, See, Austin. Supra n. 16. at 146; P. D. Finn, Fiduciary Obli~ations, 261-262 (Finn
1977); R. P. Meagher, W. ~1. C. Gummow & J. R. F. Lehane Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 134-136
(3rd cdn., 1992).

25

It has been argued that fiduciary law ought not to allow any lessening of normal fiduciary standards as
this will inevitably advantage the strong and well-informed fiduciary: See, Shepherd, Supra n. 5, at 69.

26

See, La Forest J. in 1,;lC Millerals,

Supra n. 9, at 29. See alsu, Culemall v Myers [1977] 2 N. Z. L. R.
225, where the facts convinced the New Zealand Court of Appeal to impose fiduciary obligations on a
particular company's director in favour of its individual shareholders, a relationship which the courts
have traditionally resisted labelling as fiduciary.

27

See, S/epp v Framp/ull
179 Pa. 284. 289 (1897), He Coumher. Supra n. 23 at 728-729 (per Fletcher
Moulton L. J.), and Laskill v fiacke '" Co. (1971) 23 D. L. R. (3d) 385, 392. Despite this oft·repeated
declaration, in Frame v Smith (1986) 42 D. L. R. (4th) 81, 98, Wilson J. correctly observed, "The failure
to identify and apply a general fiduciary principle has resulted in the courts relying almost exclusively
on the established list of categories of fiduciary relationships and being reluctant to grant admittance to
new relationships despite their oft-repeated declaration that the category of fiduciary relationship is
never closed."
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likewise governments have been held to owe fiduciary duties to various aboriginal
groups. The advantage of this approach to counsel is that having convinced the
court that the particular type of relationship is indeed fiduciary, the court will
attempt to formulate a standard set of obligations, which the fiduciary will have
to demonstrate have not been breached.

Undue Influence and Fiduciary Law: The Possibility of Congruence
It will be recalled that by way of the law of undue influence, equity sets
aside inter vivos transactions where either (i) one party ("the influenced party")
proves that the transaction was entered into under such influence of another
("the influencing party") that the transaction cannot be considered the free act
of the first; or (ii) the two parties are in a relationship which belongs to the class
of relationships which are presumed by the law to give the influencing party an
ability to produce a transaction favourable to himself. Traditionally, Equity texts
have tended to separate the treatment of fiduciary law and the law of undue
influence, but several commentators
now suggest that undue influence is but a
particular aspect of the fiduciary regime.~x If these suggestions are correct then
there will be considerable
benefits to the law in terms of the elimination of
overlapping jurisdiction,
of first principle.~!)

the simplification

of law, and a concentration

on issues

A number of arguments support this congruence of categories. First, fiduciary
law and the law of undue influence share the same public policy goal, viz., to
prevent the trusted party from undermining the trusting relationship.:H1 Second,
much of the legal and factual analysis undertaken by the law of undue influence
is very similar to that of fiduciary law: both employ a class of status-based
relationships,
yet allow for fact-based claims as well; both require the trusted
party to justify the transaction; and so on. Third, the vocabulary of the cases is
very similar with references to trust, confidence, confidentiality and so on appearing
in both, and with references to "fiduciary characteristics",:n
etc. to be found in
undue influence cases.:l~
As against these, it should be noted that as Commonwealth
law stands at
present there are a number of significant differences between undue influence
and fiduciary law. First, the range of remedies available for undue influence is

II, at 286, n. 15.

28

For references to some of the literature on this point. See. Flannigan ]989, Supra n.

29

For example it has been notable that in undertaking the most necessary task of rationalising the law of
restitution. there has been an acceptance by the judges, the profession and the professors alike, of the
importance of returning to first principles to determine outcomes in particular cases. In this way, much
of the confusion which abounds in the law of restitution will. hopefully. be expunged.

30

See, Flannigan 1989, Supra n. 11, at 293.

31

Johnson v Hul/ress (1936) 56 C. L. R. 113, 135 (per Dixon J.).

32

See also, the cases referred to in L. S. Sealy, "Fiduciary Relationships" Camh. I" J. 69, 78·79 (1962).
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narrower

than fiduciary remedies,

though

this seems to be changing.:::: Second, a

requirement
of the recent cases on undue influence is that the influenced party
must show that some "manifest disadvantage" has occured;::\ no such requirement
is stipulated by fiduciary law. Third, a number of dicta, most importantly those of
Lord Scarman in National Westminister Bank pIc v Morgan::" criticise any
equivalence between undue influence and fiduciary language.
In conclusion. whether the law of undue influence will merge with the law
of fiduciary obligation is unclear. My own view is that such a merger would
result in a useful rationalisation
of equitable intervention, with no diminution in
the effectiveness of the law. Since both pursue the same policy goal, and do so
essentially by the samc meallS, there seems little sense ill perpetuating
any
distinction between the two.
/nstrumentaluse

of fiduciary law

One final theme must be touched upon, viz., the instrumental
use of the
label 'fiduciary' to achieve a desired end, even though the case does not at all
lend itself to a fiduciary analysis. For example, a judge wishes to grant a
proprietary remedy; thc cause of aclion most obviously applicable does not give
rise to such a remedy; breach of fiduciary obligation
dresses up the situation as fiduciary.

docs; 'therefore,

the judge

A good example is Chase Manhattan Bank N. A. v !sraeli-British Hank
Ltd.:H; In that case, the plaintiffs had, by error, made a double payment
of $2 million in favour of the defendants. By the time the error was discovered,
the assets of the defendant were frozen due to liquidation proceedings against it.
From his judgement, it is clear that the trial judge, Coulding J., was determined

(London)

to award a proprietary remedy in favour of the plaintiff, so that the $2 million
would no longer be affected by the liquidation. To achieve this his honour was
driven to conclude that when the defendant reccived the second payment a
fiduciary obligation sprang up which required it to hold the money on trust for
the plaintiff. The reason that this line of reasoning was adopted was that ordinary
common law principles do not clearly authorise the declaration of a proprietary
remedy, whereas fiduciary law does. While we may have sympathy with a judge
33
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the problem with this approach is clear: such cases
for the proposition that whenever a person receives

a sum of money in error, they hold it as a fiduciary for the benefit of the
mistaken party and are accountable for any gain made from it and for any loss
suffered through its inappropriate
misapplication - an extraordinary
proposition
under orthodox principlesY
Thankfully, one of the heartening developments
in the debate over the
fiduciary concept is a growing awareness that decisions like Chase Manhattan
must be knocked on the head if any progress is to be made in rendering
fiduciary law more principled.:Ix The true solution, as Andrew Burrows and
others have observed, lies in the development
in the distortion of fiduciary law.::!'

of common law tracing

rules, not

The Fiduciary Principle in the Courts
At this point,

I want

to turn

from general

themes

to a consideration

of

efforts made by Commonwealth courts to formulate a fiduciary test. Through the
years, a number of judicial approaches have been suggested, among the main
approaches
being the property theory;\l' the reliance theory;~ I the unequal
relationship
theory;l~ the contractual
theory/I and the power and discretion
theory.H These have all been described and critiqued at length by Mr. Shepherd,
in his useful 1981 text, The Law of Fiduciaries,~;' and
do not propose to

I
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See, Burrows, SUI'ra n. 2. at 36ff for a good critique of the case on these grounds. Similar comments
can be found in the judgment of La Forest J. in !.IIC Mineru{s, SUI'ra n. 9. at 29·32. While I am aware
that s. 72 of the Indian Contracts Act 1872 requires a pcrson who has received an item of property
under mistake to return the item or to pay its I'alue, that statutory remedy is a personal one, not a
proprietary one and so thc Indian law on this matter conforms with common law principle.
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See, La Forest J. in UtC Miner,,/s, SUI'ra n. 9, at 29-32. As his honour notes (at p.32)
Burrows has also argued (SuI'ra n. 2, at 76) the only solution to this problem lies
recognition of the existence of a range of remedies available on a principled basis even
the context of a fiduciary relationship, e.g. the development of common law tracing rules,

39

Burrows, SUI'ru n. 2, at 76.
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"A fiduciary relationship exists where one person has legal tille and/or control over property or any
other advantage, and another is the beneficial owner thereof." : Shepherd, SlII'ru n. 5, at 52.

41

"The reliance theory ... suggests that a fiduciary relationship
confidence or reliance in another.": {hid .. at 56.
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"A fiduciary relationship exists wherever there is established an inequality of footing between the two
parties.": /hid .. at 6l.
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Shepherd, /hid. at 65. relies on Professor Finn's formulation as representative of this school of thought:
"For a person to be a fiduciary. he must first and foremost have bound himself in some way to protect
and/or advance the interests of another.": Finn 1977, SlII'ru n. 24, at 9.
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"When one has power to control another, a fiduciary obligation exists.": Shepherd, /hid., at 85, quoting
H. Brown, "Franchising a Fiduciary Relationship" 49 Tex.. L N. 650, 664 (1971).
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Students may be interested to know that the part of his book which critiques the various approaches to
fiduciary law is substantially reproduced in ~lr Shepherd's paper, "Towards a Unified Concept of
Fiduciary Relationships" 97 /" (l N. 51 (1981),
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and as Andrew
in the judicial
though outside
etc.

exists where one party reposes trust,

duplicate
this work (though
further reference
to Mr. Shepherd's
book is
inevitable!). Rather, I want to look at two tests - the Frame v Smith test, and the
"reasonable
expectations"
test - which have been developed and applied more
recently and which have won favour with Commonwealth courts.
The first approach we will consider is the "reasonable expectations" approach.
This approach was relied upon by La Forest J. in LAC Minerals and has been
used in a number of New Zealand decisions1[j (though it ought to be noted that
in New Zealand reasonable expectations appears to be fhe magical intonation
which precedes the imposition of any private law obligation, whether it be
tortious, contractual
or equitable). In LAC Minerals, La Forest J. cited with
approval an extended passage from Professor Finn's seminal 1977 work, Fiduciarv
Obligations, part of which is reproduced below:

What must be shown, in the writer's view, is that the actual circumstances
of a relationship are such that one party is entitled to expect that the
other will act in his interests in and for the purposes of the relationship.
The critical matter in the end is the role which the alleged fiduciary has,
or should be taken to have, in the relationship. It must so implicate that
party in the other's affairs or so align to him with the protection or
advancement of that other's interests that foundation exists for the
"fiduciary expectation ". Such a role may generate an actual expectation
that other's interests are being served. This is commonly so with lawyers
and investment advisers. But equally the expectation may be a judicially
prescribed one because the law itself ordains it to be that other's
entitlement. And this may be so either because that party should, given
the actual circumstances of the relationship, be accorded that entitlement
irrespective of whether he has adverted to the malter, or because the
purpose of the relationship itself is perceived to be such that to allow
disloyalty in it would be to jeopardise its perceived social utility. 47
This passage gives a good flavour of two important features of the reasonable
expectation test: First, a broad factual enquiry is necessary with a central role
being assigned to intention - what were the plaintiff's subjective expectations?,
what were the defendant's subjective expectations?, to what extent does the law
attempt to halter these subjective expectations in the name of reasonableness?,
to what degree does a plaintiff's failure to advert to fiduciary law (or underestimate
the extent of its application in his case) affect the law's view of the case?, and so
on. Second, through the concept of 'reasonableness',
public policy has an explicit
and candid role to play in determining whether the case is an appropriate
one
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Finn ]977, Supru n. 24, at 64, cited by La Forest J. in Ute Milleru/s.

42

Supru n. 9, at 29.

[]993] ] N.

for fiduciary obligations.
The principal positive aspect of this approach is that it facilitates a close
examination of the facts and allows variation of remedies and duties from case to
case. Thus, overgeneralisation

ought to be minimised.

The criticism which is usually levelled at the reasonable expectation test is
that by according such an important role to the parties' intentions, the law
makes much hinge on an assessment of something ephemeral, particularly if
subjective expectations are allowed to loom large. For example, in his critique of
the LAC Minerals case, Professor Flannigan strongly disappn)ved of any move
towards the adoption of a reasonable expectation test on the ground that it
"might result in a finding that, in the circumstance, the transaction was justified
or excusable because it must have been within the 'reasonahle expectation'
of
the parties", and thus undermine the deterrence principle encapsulated in fiduciary
law's strict liability.1x Moreover, most formulations of the reasonable expectation
test are very open and do not make it clear whose intention (i.e. the defendant's
or the plaintiff's) or what type of intention (subjective or objective) is to be
preferred in the case of a clash. \!J Accordingly, conflicting applications
of the
reasonable
expectation
test have occurred
and little consistency
has been
established from case to case.
In addition, the reasonahle expectation test greatly facilitates the invocation
of our friend, the "commercial-nature-of-the-transaction"
rhetoric; many judges
will say that since generally speaking business people do not expect fiduciary
relationships to spring up in their dealings with each other, then on an objective
test it is next to impossible for a particular business person to say that he
reasonably expected fiduciary law to apply.
Finally, mention

must be made of a criticism

levelled at the "contractual

theory" by Mr.' Shepherd, but which has equal application to the reasonable
expectation test. The danger with a reasonable expectation test is that by allowing
the subjective intentions of the parties to enter the equation, the possibility
exists for the exercise of superior bargaining power to contract out of fiduciary
obligations. As Shepherd observes,"l1

The problem of contracting out is that the stronger the fiduciary, the
more able he is to reduce or remove the fiduciary obligation. This would
appear to be precisely the opposite effect to that the courts should seek.

1990. Supra n. 9, at 67.

48

Flannigan

49

See, Professor
Aspects

50

Shepherd,

Finn's

of Trusts
SUf1YU

formulation

and Fiduciarv

in "Fiduciary
Obli~ations,

Law and

the

9 (E. ~1cl<cndrick

n. 5, at 69·70.

43

~lodern

Commercial

cd .. 1992), [Finn

Law",

19921.

Commercial

The concept of reasonable expectations
encourages the courts to regard
contracting out clauses as entirely compatible with the fiduciary principle, whereas
this should not always be the case. Rather, any judicial approval of contracting
out clauses ought to be made on a case by case basis, with appropriate attention
to the extent to which allowing such clauses to operate will undermine
the
public policy of supporting trusting relationships in each case.
Let us turn

now to the Frame v Smith test, set out in the dissenting"]

judgement
of Wilson J. in the case of that name."2 In Frame, the plaintiff
(separated from his defendant wife) had been awarded generous visiting privileges
to his children, who remained in the custody of the defendant. The defendant
deliberately undermined
these privileges by moving from town to town, telling
the children that the plaintiff was not their' father, diverting gifts and letters, and
so on. In this way, the plaintiff's access was effectively destroyed, and he sued
for compensation.
At the invitation of the Supreme Court of Canada, the plaintiff
argued inter alia that the relationship between custodial and non-custodial parents
was analogous to traditional fiduciary relationships and should be clothed with
the protection of fiduciary law. In a judgement,
which is now regarded as a
leader in the area, Wilson J. laid out the following three-prong test:"]
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation
seem to possess three general characteristics:

have [sic] been imposed

(1)

The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion

or power.

(2)

The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion
to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests.

(3)

The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the
fiduciary holding the discretion or power.

so as

As to the first characteristic
of a fiduciary relationship,
it is clear that
Wilson J. intended a very broad meaning to be given to "power or discretion": in
Frame her honour held that this requirement
was satisfied because, "[t]he
custodial parent has been placed as a result of the court's order in a position of
power and authority over the children with the potential to prejudicially affect
and indeed utterly destroy their relationship
with their non-custodial
parent
through improper exercise of the power.""l In adopting a test as broad as this, it
is clear that Wilson J. intended that the law of fiduciaries ought to extend
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The majority held that it would be inappropriate to impose any judicially crcatcd obligations on thc
custodial parent in addition to the pcnalties providcd by statutc; the court thcreforc did not have to. and
did not, comment upon Wilson J.'s iiduciary tcst.
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(1986) 42 D. L. R. (4th) 81. 84-111.
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Ihid, at 99.
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Ihid, at 102,
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beyond any proprietary
moorings, and be capable of application to situations
where non-proprietary
powers/discretions
are involved. This is a development
worth supporting·
confining fiduciary law to property means that either the law
has to ignore certain types of transactions
altogether or else it must label as
'property' things (e. g. corporate business opportunities or confidential information)
which are traditionally not so labelled, thereby undermining
the legitimacy of
the decision in the eyes of many practitioners and judges, and moreover leading
to inappropriate analogies with trust law.""
The second requirement
of Wilson J.'s test emphasises (a) the ability to
exercise power/discretion
unilaterally,
(b) in such a way as to affect the
beneficiary's
interests, whether legal or practical. The former underscores
the
nature of a fiduciary power/discretion
- the power/discretion
is such that it
provides the opportunity to take decisions and implement them to the beneficiary's
disadvantage, without interference. The latter reminds us that the interest which
may be affected by the fiduciary's actions does not have to be one which has the
full recognition of the law in other instances - for example, Wilson J. suggests
that fiduciary law will compensate
a company where one of its directors
undermines the company's
by the law in general."l;

public image or reputation,

an interest

not recognised

The final requirement, and the most controversial, is that the beneficiary be
"peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary". There are, essentially,
two aspects to the controversy: first, what does "vulnerable/at
the mercy of"
mean?, second, what significance attaches· to the word "peculiarly"? While one
must always be mindful of the constant judicial warning to the effect that the
words of a judgement are not to be read like the words of a statute, these two
questions

are not semantic exercises, but rather ones of first importance.

Let us take the "vulnerability"
this: does "vulnerability"

controversy

first. The nub of the issue is

refer to the balance of power before the parties

enter

into a relationship, or does it refer to the balance of power after the parties have
entered into a particular relationship? Clearly, the correct answer must be that
vulnerability refers to the balance of power between the parties after the particular
relationship has been entered"; - for example, in the case of a director of a large
corporation
such as General Motors or lI3M it could hardly be contended that
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As to. the latter, See, Shepherd, Supra n. 5, at 55.
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n. 5, at 99. It eQuId be suggested that the interest Qf the CrQwn in nQt having its unifQrm
debased and its reputatiQn with friendly states tarnished was the interest affected by Sergeant Reading's
use Qf his PQsitiQn to' have smugglers' vehicles waved thrQugh Egyptian custQms checks: Reuding v
Allorneg-Gelleral
[19511 A. C. 507, [1951] 1 All E. R. 617 ( H. L.).
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prior to entering into the directorship
the director has more power than the
corporation.
Yet the latter will be entitled to expect the director to abide by
fiduciary standards upon assuming that office, because the director has great
powers which he can use to the disadvantage of the corporation. However, there
is an obvious problem associated with this viewpoint - while it is undoubtedly
the more accurate description of the type of vulnerability present in all fiduciary
relationships,
it is a very broad test, which on its own leaves a large number of
commercial situations open to fiduciary incidents."H
It is at this stage I suggest

that we turn to the word "peculiarly".

The word

itself suggests that it is not every vulnerability which is intended to be the
subject of fiduciary law, only those deserving of fiduciary law's protection.
Interestingly, though her honour did not explicitly link them with "peculiarly",
of her
in Frame, Wilson J. made two points relating to the third characteristic
test: (i) it would only be met if there was a grave inadequacy or absence of other
legal or practical remedies to redress the wrongful exercise of the defendant's
discretion or power and (ii) vulnerability
was unlikely to be found to exist
between business people because "any 'vulnerability' could have been prevented
through the more prudent exercise of their bargaining power"?) In this way it
can be seen that "peculiarly" serves as a "public policy" backstop. In a sense the
intrusion of public policy is inevitable - the breadth of the remedies, the generality
of Wilson J.'s test (which she admitted was "a rough and ready guide"(iO) and the
trepidation at the thought of entangling commerce in the net of fiduciary
(which we have referred to previously) all ensure this.

law

Despite the uncertainties
relating to it, Wilson J.'s three-prong
test has
proven to be attractive to both the Supreme Court of Canada and to the New
Zealand courtS.1i1 Moreover, there is little reason to suspect that it does not
reflect current views of the High Court of Australia - Wison J. herself acknowledged
that her formulation was significantly influenced by various judgements
of that
court.li~ Certainly, as a framework within which courts and practitioners
alike
can attempt to make sense of fiduciary arguments, her approach is commendable
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See, J. D. McCamus. 2 SUI'. Ct. L Nev. (2d) 505. 527-528, (1991). DeMott, SUJlrll n. 1. at 914. observes
that, "the law of fiduciaries is inapplicablc to somc situations in which one party is cvidcntly vulncrablc
to abuse by anothcr." Shc uscs as an cxamplc of the guarantor-principal dcbtor relationship, which has
ncver been classified as fiduciary cvcn though the principal dcbtor by entcring into certain transactions
can incrcasc his risk of default and thus incrcases the guarantor's risk of bcing called upon to satisfy the
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as it touches upon the main elements shown to be of importance in the case law
to date, and presents them in a workable form. Moreover, it is superior to the
reasonable
expectations
test in that its elements are less open to con/1icting
interpretations, and in that it avoids the near contractual rhetoric of the reasonable
expectations test.

Professor Flannigan's

Thesis

Having considered judicial attempts to formulate a fiduciary principle, it is
appropriate now to turn to the academy for assistance. From the large range of
commentators
on this topic, I would like to single out the work of Professor
Robert Flannigan of Saskatchewan
Law School, as in my opinion his test is one
of the best available.
In his article, "The Fiduciary Obligation"/i:l Professor Flannigan argues that
a fiduciary is one who acquires access to assets (of another person) for some
defined or limited purpose. His analysis proceeds in the following manner: First,
it is important to define the purpose of fiduciary law. According to Flannigan the
purpose
of the law is no less than maintaining
the integrity of trusting
relationships.ij~ Bearing this in mind, the law must therefore identify the mischief
which flows from abuse of trusting relationships and formulate the law accordingly.
Second,

Flannigan

identifies two' types of trusting

situations

which the law

must protect, first, "deferential trusts', and second, 'vigilant trusts'. The former
normally involve intimate or close interaction between the trusted and trusting
persons (eg. solicitor-client, doctor-patient, parent-child, priest-penitent, etc.) where
the danger exists that the influence which naturally /1ows from the deferential
confidence or trust reposed by the trusting party will be abused. The latter
normally involve situations where the fiduciary has direct access to, or control
over, the beneficiary's assets and can divert (or fail to maintain) the value of
those assets (eg. trustee-beneficiary,
agent-principal, partner-partner,
etc.). In the
case of 'deferential trusts' the fiduciary has indirect access to the beneficiary's
assets; that is, while the fiduciary does not have direct access to, or control over,
the assets, their trusted position allows them the opportunity
to participate in
the original decision-making process, relating to the employment of those assets.
In the case of 'vigilant trusts', the fiduciary has direct access to the assets, and
his access allows him to negatively affect the implementation
of decisions taken
by others, by diverting the assets (and their value) from their intended purpose.
As Flannigan himself emphasises both types of trust involve the same mischief,
viz., the diversion of asset value from optimum results; it is just the stage at
which the diversion occurs {either at the decisional or· the implementational
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Flannigan 1989, Supra n. II.
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lhid. at 297 and 310.
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stage) which differs.
Third, it is important to appreciate that the term 'assets' is to be broadly
construed.
Thus, the term 'asset' extends to authority over or proximity to
assets, such as a purchasing agent has, and to the holding of a discretionary
power over assets.
Fourth, Flannigan notes that it is the limited nature or purpose of the
fiduciary's access to the beneficiary's assets which makes the fiduciary subject to
strict regulation; implicit in the notion of limited access, is the potential for
(opportunistic)
departure from the original purpose of access. [t is the purpose
of fiduciary law, in turn, to discourage such departure.I;';
Fifth, according to Flannigan there are four components
of the fiduciary
obligation, not all of which will be applicable necessarily in every case. Those
four are the 'conflict',
the 'influence',
the 'partiality',
and the 'avoidance'
components
respectively. The title of each component should convey its core
content: the 'conflict' component refers to the ways in which fiduciaries can act
inconsistently with the trust reposed in them, the 'influence' component to the
ability to influence decision making by the trusting party; 'partiality' to the duty
to treat beneficiaries fairly (generally applicable only to certain types of trust);
'avoidance' to the duty not to delegate one's fiduciary powers to another, nor to
fetter their exercise.()(j Which components
of the fiduciary obligation will be
applicable in any given situation will depend on the factual structure
of the
relationship at issue, and all four will not necessarily be applicable in every case
of fiduciary law. What is important, according to Flannigan, is that when in
doubt as to which components ought to apply, the courts should calculate the
content of the obligation so as to ensure that the integrity of the trusting
relationship is fully maintained.'i? Moreover, once one recalls that the purpose of
the law is to maintain the integrity of trusting relationships,
then it is only
correct to regard specific rules of fiduciary conduct as illustrative, though not
exhaustive of the fiduciary obligation. [n other words, "[t]here can be no final
and exhaustive definition of the precise 'content' of any obligation at any time."li8
The attractions
of the Flannigan thesis seem to me to be the following:
First, his theory emphasises the close connection between the purpose of the law
and the rules which underpin it; in other words, black-letter law cannot be
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"Generally, if a person has access to assets. and that access is subject to a defined or limited purpose, a
mischief is possible ... [because thatl person can employ those assets for other than their defined
purpose. ": Flannigan 1990. Supra n. 9, at 50.

II, at 310-319.
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various spccific proscriptivc rules.
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separated
from a consideration
of the law's theoretical foundation.
Without
sufficient regard to fiduciary law's purpose, any attempt to formulate a test or
tests will f1oL:nder. Second, his theory is sufficiently abstract to allow for its
application to novel situations without preconceived ideas dimming one's view.
(For example, note his use of the word 'asset' so as to escape the preconceived
notions which accompany the use of the word 'property'.) At the same time it is
clearly adequate to the task of describing the law as it presently stands. In short,
his theory looks both forward and backward, an admirable task for any theory to
have achieved. Third, his division between 'deferential'
and 'vigilant' trusts is
sound, and helps one to appreciate more fully the various ways in which a
person may trust another, and so, the mischief which must be remedied. Moreover,
he uses it to offer an insightful perspective on the relationship between fiduciary
law and the law of undue inOuence. Fourth, his fourfold division of the fiduciary
obligation explains in a straightforward
and analytically satisfying manner the
various aspects of this multi-faceted obligation, without closing the door to the
development of new rules in the future.

Compensation for breach of Fiduciary Duty and Non-Proprietary
Relationships: Riders in relation to the Indian Trusts Act

Fiduciary

f3efore concluding, I want to attach two riders in relation to the application
of Commonwealth developments to the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.
First, section 88 of the 1882 Act (and indeed the 1882 Act in general)
appears to be concerned to regulate the conduct of fiduciary obligations connected
to property or property-dealing;
the implication of this observation is that cases
where no property interest lies at the heart of the relationship
may not fall
within the terms of section 88. Thus, cases such as Frame v Smith,W KM v HM,1°
or Norberg v Wynrib71 may not attract the fiduciary principle under the Indian
Act, though they would be protected in other common law jurisdictions.
Second, the remedy stipulated by section 88 is disgorgement (i. e. restitution
of any advantage gained from breach of the obligation) effected by way of
constructive trust,7~ not the payment of compensation for damage suffered by
the beneficiary through the fiduciary's actions. Again, the use of compensation
to effect a remedial solution has been one of the prominent features of the
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Interference by custodial parent with non-custodial parent's access to children; majority not considering
the merits as to whether fiduciary obligation was breached and finding against non-custodial parent on
other grounds; minority judge, Wilson J., finding fiduciary law triggered: Supru n. 52.
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Sexual abuse of a child by parent amounts to a breach of fiduciary obligation: Supru n. 61.

71

Doctor-patient relationship; sexual favours demanded by defendant doctor in exchange for giving drugs
to the plaintiff; breach of fiduciary obligation found: Supru n. 61.

72

See, as to the use of constructive trusts to give effect to section 88, D. D. Basu, Equ'ity, Trusts. Specific
Relief, (5th edn. 1983) 149 and 142; and, B. M. Gandhi, Equitv. Trusts and Specific Relief, (2nd edn.
1993) 350ff.
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modern law,73 linked closely, though not exclusively, to the need to protect, in an
effective manner, non-proprietary interests (which, obviously, cannot be vindicated
by a constructive
trust - what was there for the custodial parent .in Frame v
Smith to restitute to the non-custodial parent?).
As to the first point, the following possibilities exist: (a) it may be that the
Commonwealth
developments in non-proprietary
fiduciary relationships
are not
transferable to India; (b) it may be that much of the work done through common
law development
of fiduciary law in the Commonwealth
has been achieved in
India by statute;74 or (c) it may be that the judges will be able to evolve Indian
common law or statute law in such a way as to harness Commonwealth
developments so far as the non-proprietary fiduciary relationships are concerned.
I have no answer as to which of the three is most likely to be chosen; but I am
certain that it will soon be a matter of judicial determination as awareness of the
potential of fiduciary law increases.
As to the second, it might be suggested that section 23 of the 1882 Act7s
could be applied to justify an award of damages for breach fiduciary obligations.
Certainly, the section provides for damages as a remedy for breach of trust, but
that said, the section must be read, and surely would be read, in light of the
explanations
to the section, and in light of the Part of the Act in which it
appears, both of which contain clear overtones of trust property and dealings
with that property. Thus, while trustees may be liable in damages, other fiduciary
officers may not. As against this, however, to draw a distinction between trustees
and other fiduciary officers for the purpose of damage awards strikes one as
unprincipled
in theory, and certainly runs against the received wisdom of Equity
- indeed, the most celebrated instance of compensation
being awarded as an
equitable remedy occurred in the 1914 House of Lords decision, Nocton v Lord
Ashburton,16 a case involving a solicitor/client
relationship,
not a trustee/
beneficiary one.
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It should be noted that Commonwealth courts and practitioners have only recently awoken to the
possibilities open to them under equity's compensatory jurisdiction, and that the English courts in
particular have been very slow to utilise this jurisdiction for breaches of fiduciary obligations. Good
essays on equitable compensation arc I. E. Davidson. "The Equitable Remedy of Compensation" 13
Me/h. /I. L. R. 349 (1982); W. M. C. Gummow, "Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty" in Youdan
(ed.), Supra n. 33; and, C. E. F. Rickett & T. Gardner, "Compensating for Loss in Equity: the Evolution
of a Remedy" 24 V. /I. W Ib R. (1994).
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For example, Mr. Ch. Suryanarayana Rao has suggested that much of the work done by fiduciary law in
company law overseas, can be achieved in India by reliance upon the relevant statutory provisions in
force here: See, Ch. S. Rao, Role of Directors in Company Law, (1968).
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The relevant part of section 23 reads: "S. 23: Liability for breach of trust: Where the trustee commits a
breach of trust, he i~ liable to make good the loss which the trust-property or the beneficiary has
thereby sustained ....•
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[1914] A. C. 932, [1914-19151 All E. R. Rep. 45.
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Finally, I should reiterate that the doubts surrounding a compensatory
jurisdiction and the application of section 88 to non proprietary relationships
does not destroy the usefulness of Commonwealth developments to the Indian
practitioner or student; at worst, the field of application of Commonwealth
developments may be narrowed.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to introduce to you aspects of the
current Commonwealth debate as to who is fiduciary. The general themes which
we considered, such as the interaction between fiduciary law and commercial
transactions, are important because these themes are returned to time and time
again in the cases which involve fiduciary claims. An understanding of these
themes is essential to a proper understanding of the purpose, current position,
and future direction, of fiduciary law. Examination of the two tests which appear
to have won a certain measure of support from Commonwealth courts, ind1cated
the factors which are currently regarded by judges as important in determining
whether a fiduciary relationship exists or not. Finally, consideration of Professor
Flannigan's theory will, I hope, stimulate you to take a critical look at fiduciary
law. In conclusion, I hope that this paper, taken as a whole, will enable you to
critically evaluate the application of fiduciary law in India, and the role for
Commonwealth jurisprudence in such an exercise.

SOA

